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Abstract: This paper re-interprets the precautionary principle as a “social epistemic rule”. First, it argues that sometimes policy-makers should act on claims which have not been scientifically established. Second, it argues that, given how scientists ought to solve “inductive risk” problems, such guidance is required not only under actual conditions, but under any plausible conditions. Third, it suggests that procedural fairness may provide policy-makers with reasons to be very reluctant to act on claims which are not scientifically established. The restriction of precautionary reasoning to contexts of significant environmental or public health disaster may respond to this problem. 
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The politics of certainty: the precautionary principle, inductive risk and procedural fairness

There is much disagreement over which principles should guide policy-makers’ decisions. One set of debates revolves around whether they should use Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) or (at least sometimes) adopt a “precautionary principle” (PP) (Sunstein, 2002; Sandin, 2007). Any principle for decision-making, however, takes factual claims as inputs. Just as different decision principles might recommend different policies on the basis of the same factual claims, so, too, the same decision principle might lead to different policies on the basis of different factual claims. For example, a CBA based on an estimate that 10% of bees will die from neonicitinoid exposure might conclude that the benefits of continued neonicitinoid use outweigh the costs, whereas one based on an estimate of 20% mortality might reach the opposite conclusion. Therefore, as well as decision principles, policy-makers need “acceptance principles”, which specify when they should accept some factual claim, i.e. treat that claim as a premise in practical reasoning. In theory, all sorts of acceptance principles might govern policy-making inputs: for example, “accept all and only the claims uttered by the oracle”. As I explain shortly, however, in practice the key problem in most policy-making is the proper role of scientifically established results. 

Consider two canonical formulations of the precautionary principle: 
where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental degradation, lack of full scientific certainty should not be treated as a reason to postpone cost-effective measures at mitigation (United Nations General Assembly 1992, principle 15).
and:
when an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically (Wingspread Statement, 1998).
 
Prima facie, both principles tell policy-makers what to do – take precautions under such-and-such circumstances – rather than accept. Unsurprisingly, then, most discussions of the PP treat it as decision principle, in place of or supplementary to, tools such as CBA. For example, Stephen Gardiner influentially interprets the PP as a maxi-min procedure for decision-making under uncertainty (Gardiner, 2006). However, both formulations also seem to encode an (admittedly vague) acceptance principle: that we should accept certain claims even when they are not scientifically established. In a careful recent discussion, Daniel Steel (2015, p10-11) has, then, distinguished three versions of the PP: as a procedural constraint, a decision rule or an epistemic rule. It is quite simply unclear whether the PP is supposed to guide (or constrain) our actions or our beliefs (Peterson, 2007). 

Despite these complexities, most discussions of the principle view it as primarily a decision rule, and only secondarily (if at all) as an acceptance rule. In this paper, I argue that, in light of recent debates in philosophy of science over “inductive risk”, there is a coherent interpretation of the principle solely as an acceptance principle. To frame and motivate my arguments, consider some putative “acceptance principles” for regulating the relationship between science and policy. The first is the “sufficiency principle” (SP):  
If some claim, “p” has been “scientifically established” then policy-makers should accept “p” when formulating policy.

Where by “scientifically established” I mean that, after thorough research, there is a consensus among competent scientists to accept “p” as a premise in further theoretical reasoning. The SP implies, for example, that, given the scientific consensus that cigarette smoking is a cause of lung cancer, policy-makers should accept this claim when formulating public health policy. This seems eminently plausible. 

We might think to supplement the SP with a second “necessity principle” (NP):
If some claim “p” has not been “scientifically established”, then policy-makers should not accept “p” when formulating policy.
Policy makers sometimes appeal to (something like) the NP. For example, the UK environment minister Lord de Mauley justified his government’s vote against an EU wide ban on neonicitinoids as follows: “having a healthy bee population is a top priority for us but we did not support the proposal because our scientific evidence doesn't support [the claim that neonicitinoids cause bee hive collapse]” (quoted in Carrington, 2013). The NP is, however, an awful principle. Consider, the situation of the UK government in the early 1990s when faced with evidence that BSE might spread from cattle to humans in the form of CJD. Because this was a new threat, there was no scientific consensus around such questions as how to prevent transmission. The best anyone could do was to make educated guesses (Yearley, 1997). It would be odd to insist that policy-makers should not have acted on the basis of any such estimates, but waited for a scientific consensus. Doing so could have had catastrophic consequences. 

This may seem rather unfair to de Mauley. After all, unlike the BSE case, there have been studies on the effects of neonicitinoids. In 2013 the UK’s Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) published a meta-analysis which concluded “while this assessment cannot exclude rare effects of neonicotinoids on bees in the field, it suggests that effects on bees do not occur under normal circumstances” (DEFRA 2013, 1). Maybe, then, de Mauley was appealing to a “Weak Necessity Principle” (WNP):
If, after thorough research there is a consensus among competent scientists that some claim “p” has not been “scientifically established”, then policy-makers should not accept “p” when formulating policy.
(Note that, given the contrary findings of the European Food and Safety Authority, even this principle would not necessarily justify de Mauley’s claim, but that is a separate issue). 

In 1, I argue that the WNP is not a defensible acceptance principle, and propose an apparently modest interpretation of the “precautionary principle” as a warning against the WNP. In 2, I show how these arguments clarify the relationship between the precautionary principle and debates over whether scientific justification should be “value free”. Finally, in 3, I argue that placing these debates side-by-side provides us with an unusual justification for the precautionary principle’s focus on certain forms of environmental damage: as a trade-off between making policy-making as flexible as rationality requires while respecting norms of procedural fairness. The link between the precautionary principle and debates over inductive risk has been explored previously (John 2007; Steel 2015). My arguments are novel, however, both in how they generalise these concerns, and in stressing how norms of procedural fairness limit demands of practical and epistemic rationality, hence locating the principle within the broader topic of the politics of certainty.       

 Section 1: The simple argument from inductive risk

The simple argument from inductive risk against the WNP runs as follows: 
1) Scientists face problems of “inductive risk” 
2) Policy-makers face an analogous problem of “inductive risk” 
3) Scientists respond to such problems by using “fixed, high epistemic standards” 
4) Policy-makers ought to respond to their problems by using “floating acceptance principles” 
5) From 3 and 4, there might be claims which scientists do not accept, but which policy-makers should accept
6) From 5, if the WNP governs policy-makers’ acceptance of claims, then they will sometimes fail to accept claims which they should accept
7) Therefore, the WNP should not govern policy-makers’ acceptance of claims

In this section, I fill out this argument and show how it relates to the precautionary principle. Before going further, note that my discussion of inductive risk problems is highly schematic, and that the distinction between acceptance and decision principles may often be blurred. However, the argument is helpful as a way of understanding the basic shape of a deep problem which takes a wide variety of forms in practice.  

My first premise – that scientists face problems of “inductive risk – follows from three sub-premises:
1a. Scientists accept or reject hypotheses.
1b. Typically, these hypotheses are not deductively entailed by the available evidence.
1c. As such, scientists face “problems of inductive risk”: they risk accepting hypotheses which are, in fact, false (“false positives”) or rejecting hypotheses which are, in fact, true (“false negatives”). 

One could, of course, deny premise 1a. I return to this in Section 2. However, given these claims, it follows that scientists’ acceptance (and/or assertion of claims – again I return to the relationship between acceptance and assertion below) must be governed by “epistemic standards”: (more-or-less explicit) rules which tell them when the evidence in favour of some claim is sufficient for them properly to accept (or assert) that claim.​[1]​

My second premise is that policy-makers face a similar problem. For example, during the BSE crisis, UK policy-makers faced a problem of deciding whether or not to accept claims about the causal relationship between BSE in cows and CJD in humans. In making such decisions, they, too, had to “trade-off” different risks of error: between accepting claims which were, in fact, false, and failing to accept claims which were, in fact, true. Policy-makers, too, need “epistemic standards”. To avoid confusion, I have called these “acceptance principles”. 

Before going further, it is useful to clarify the scope of my discussion.​[2]​ In environmental policy, policy-makers are often concerned with how best to respond to “low probability, high impact” events, and the precautionary principle is often invoked in such cases. It is important, then, to distinguish two uses of the concept of probability: as referring to the “objective” likelihood that an event will happen; and as referring to the degree-of-support some hypothesis enjoys relative to some body-of-evidence. (There are various ways of marking this distinction: for example, as “existential” versus “epistemic” probability (Hawkins, 1943); or in terms of endo- versus meta-doxastic uncertainty (Hansson 2006).) My focus is on the latter concept; specifically, when we are permitted to move from some “epistemic” probability estimate to outright acceptance of that claim. As such, the problems I discuss arise whenever we accept some claim (in science or in policy), including when we come to accept claims of the objective variety. I do not take any positon on whether we should treat certain kinds of “objective” or “existential” risks differently from others. (Indeed, strictly, my position is silent on whether policy-makers should be concerned solely with objective risks, or also with “perceived risks” (Slovic, 1987), although it clearly assumes that information about the former are important). Drawing this distinction may, however, seem problematic, because there are, of course, important philosophical questions about how the different kinds of probability statement are related (Hansson, 2006). In defence of my assumption that there is a distinction between “epistemic” and “objective” risk note, note that, in discussing policy-making, we often find it very useful to distinguish these different kinds of probability. For example, as Wendy Parker (2014) discusses, model-derived estimates of the probability of certain outcomes of climate change are, themselves, often subject to significant “second-order uncertainty” in virtue of uncertainty over the assumptions used to build these models. Perhaps one could reduce these two forms of uncertainty to a single measure, but doing so would not help us understand actual policy-making dilemmas. In turn, a clear-eyed focus on epistemic uncertainty helps reveal a way in which the PP is relevant across policy-making contexts, not only when making decisions about (objective or existential) “risks”.   

To return to my main argument: both scientists and policy-makers face problems of inductive risk. My third premise is that, as a matter of fact, scientists resolve these problems by appeal to what Isaac Levi called community-level “scientific standards of inference” (Levi, 1960, 356). Specifically, I suggest that scientists tend to accept claims only when they meet “high epistemic standards”, i.e. when the evidence in favour of those claims is such that there is a low risk of a false positive. For example, it is routine to accept a hypothesis only when it is highly statistically significant (i.e. at least less than p = 0.05). This practice is highly institutionalised in norms governing journal publication. Of course, not all actual scientists always actually adhere to high standards; furthermore, standards which we think reduce our chances of false positives may, in fact, do no such thing. However, we tend to think of such cases as “failures”; even if scientists do not always succeed in meeting high epistemic standards, we hope and assume that good scientists do so (John, 2015). I assume, then, that scientific inference is, as a matter of fact, governed by high epistemic standards. 

How ought policy-makers respond to their problem of inductive risk? My fourth premise is that they should adopt “floating” acceptance principles. The degree-of-certainty that some claim should enjoy before it is properly accepted by policy-makers should vary with the expected costs of acting on different sorts of error. The higher the expected costs of acting on “false positive”, the more evidence policy-makers should require before accepting the relevant claim; while the higher the expected costs of not acting (on the basis of a “false negative”) the less evidence policy-makers should require for acceptance. This principle instantiates a basic norm of practical reasoning: that the amount of evidence it is rational to demand before accepting a claim turns on the relative costs of false acceptance and of failures to accept true claims. For example, the more important it is to me that the bank is open – say, the greater the urgency that I pay in a cheque – then the more evidence I should require before accepting that claim.​[3]​   

The third and fourth premises imply 5; that there might be claims which, given the high standards which do govern scientific acceptance, scientists properly do not accept, but which policy-makers should accept given their ends. Call a claim which scientists should accept, given their epistemic standards, “scientifically established”, and one which they should not accept “not scientifically established”. There is often controversy over whether or not some claim has been “scientifically established” (the debate over neonicitinoids illustrates this phenomenon). However, if, after thorough investigation, there is consensus that some claim is not “scientifically established”, then it is reasonable to assume that claim is not “scientifically established”. The WNP says that policy-makers should not accept a claim when (it is reasonable to assume that) it is not scientifically established. Given claim 4, this would forbid policy-makers from accepting claims which they should accept. Therefore, we should reject the WNP.  

As noted in the Introduction, canonical statements of the PP claim that policy-makers should act on the basis of claims which are not “scientifically established”; hence contradicting the WNP. My comments above suggest, then a modest interpretation of the precautionary principle as telling us something about which factual claims should enter into decision-making, rather than as a decision principle. As such, it is compatible, for example, with using Cost Benefit Analysis to make decisions on the basis of such claims (as may already be hinted at in the Rio Declaration formulation, which, otherwise oddly, stresses the need for cost-effective measures). Indeed, on this interpretation, the principle is not even itself strictly an acceptance principle. Rather, it is more like a meta-principle, ruling out any first-order acceptance principles which would make scientific certainty necessary for claims to enter into policy-making. 

Reading the precautionary principle as a meta-acceptance principle has important benefits; most notably, arguments for precaution need not rely on (potentially contentious) ethical or religious viewpoints. Rather, the principle states a kind of “epistemological common-sense”. However, doing so leaves open an important question: how certain we should be of some claim before it enters policy? Furthermore, this interpretation seems to ignore a distinctive feature of standard formulations of the principle, that they distinguish between “normal” and “special” (specifically, large-scale environmental or public health) harms. I return to these issues in 3. First, however, I will strengthen the scope of my argument against the WSP, by showing how it relates to the debates in which concerns over inductive risk are commonly raised: over the “Value Free Ideal” for science (VFI).  

Section 2 Inductive risk: who should decide?

No-one denies that non-epistemic political and ethical values should play a role in scientific research; for example, in topic choice and in setting restrictions on experimentation (Kitcher, 2009, Chaps 8 and 9). However, many hold that science should be “value free” in the sense that “the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. political or moral) grounds” (Betz, 2013, 207). Recently, some philosophers, most notably Heather Douglas (2007), have resuscitated Richard Rudner’s argument against this claim (Rudner, 1953). Rudner’s argument can be reconstructed as follows:
a. Scientists face problems of inductive risk
b. There is no (responsible) way to set the trade off between false positives and false negatives other than by appeal to the non-epistemic costs associated with acting on different types of error.
c. Therefore, scientists must appeal to ethical values in scientific inference.
Imagine two scientists. The first is investigating the hypothesis that a toxic ingredient is not present in lethal quantities. The second is investigating the hypothesis that a lot of belt buckles is not defective. According to Rudner, the first scientist would properly require a higher degree of confirmation before accepting her hypothesis than would the second before accepting hers, because “the consequences of making a mistake [in the first case] are exceedingly grave by our moral standards” (Rudner, 1953, p2). 

My argument for the precautionary principle shares with Rudner’s argument for value-laden science the assumption that scientists face problems of inductive risk (premise 1 in Section 1 and premise a. above). The rest of my argument assumes a descriptive claim – premise 3 – about how scientists do resolve such problems; by appeal to “scientific standards of inference” which minimise false positives. Rudner, by contrast, moves from his premise to a normative claim about how they ought to resolve these problems. Of course, strictly, my descriptive claim is compatible with Rudner’s normative claim. However, there is a tension between my normative conclusion – that we should endorse the precautionary principle – and Rudner’s claims. In effect, Rudner claims that the scientist should vary her standards for acceptance by appeal to the non-epistemic consequences of different kinds of error; she should play the role I assigned to the policy-maker. Should the scientist or the policy-maker decide how certain is “certain enough” for policy?​[4]​ 

This is a stark framing of a complex question, but it illuminates actual debates. For example, the prominent climate scientist James Hansen has argued that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change displays a morally problematic “scientific reticence” (Hansen, 2007, 3). Such concerns can be interpreted in terms of a clash between an ideal according to which scientists should employ high epistemic standards and an ideal according to which they should be willing to take epistemic risks when policy-makers’ failure to accept claims might be disastrous.

To address the politics of certainty properly, note that there is a third possible way of thinking about the problems above. Both arguments above share an assumption that scientists face problems of inductive risk because they accept or reject claims outright. One response to Rudner’s argument (and later reformulations), initially developed by Richard Jeffrey, is that this claim is false: rather, scientists simply report the epistemic probabilities of claims conditional on the evidence (Jeffrey, 1956; Betz, 2013). Debate rages over whether this is an adequate characterisation of actual scientific practice (Douglas, 2007; Steel, 2013; John, 2015). However, we can bypass these debates by reformulating the claim normatively: scientists should report epistemic probabilities. It is a job for the policy-maker to decide when those claims are sufficiently well-established to be accepted in policy. (Of course, you may worry that the shift to the normative perspective is tricky, because “ought implies can” and scientists simply cannot report bare probabilities – leave this to one side, for the sake of argument).

We have three possible normative claims about how scientists ought to respond to problems of inductive risk, when they know that their claims will be relevant to some policy:
a. The “Jeffrey option”: scientists need not solve problems of inductive risk at all: rather they should simply report epistemic probabilities
b. The “Rudner/Douglas option”:  scientists must solve problems of inductive risk and decide when policy-relevant claims are “certain enough” to be reported; they should do so by considering the non-epistemic costs of decision-makers acting on different sorts of error
c. The “status quo” option: scientists must solve problems of inductive risk and decide when policy-relevant claims are “certain enough” to be reported; they should do so by appeal to intra-scientific norms according to which claims are only to be accepted or asserted when they meet high standards.
Placing to one side the intrinsic value of knowledge or the constitutive ends of science, to focus solely on which option would best promote good policy-making, prima facie a. seems preferable to b. and c. The Rudner/Douglas option, b, apparently requires scientists to gain further knowledge about the likely non-epistemic costs of different sorts of error and to make (potentially contentious) evaluative judgments about relative disvalue of costs. Option a. seems to avoid these problems. Of course, so, too, does option c. However, unlike the “status quo” option c, the “Jeffrey option” seems to ensure that scientists’ work is maximally policy-relevant. As I discuss below, a proponent of the status quo, c., would certainly not want to say that scientists should always be silent when they know that a claim is supported by the evidence, even if it is not “scientifically established”. However, the status quo does require a tricky distinction between claims which a scientist should report qua scientist, and claims she should report qua some other role. Option a. avoids such messiness. 

However, ultimately, the appeal of the Jeffrey option is chimerical. Even when scientists have calculated the probability of some claim conditional on the evidence, they face a communicative choice: is it worth reporting this epistemic probability? (Of course, this is a simplification, because most scientists’ communicative choices will be guided by institutional incentives. I assume that institutional structures should be sensitive to how communicative choices should be made). It is not clear that all epistemic probabilities are worth reporting: for example, it may be certain that, given a very limited body of evidence, there is only a low probability that some claim is true.  However, such a claim is compatible with the claim being highly certain were we to collect other forms of evidence. A world where scientists simply reported all the epistemic probabilities they can calculate would be awash with confusing information of little interest or use to anyone. Therefore, communicative choices must be filtered by some principle; for example, that one should only bother to report claims which enjoy a particular degree-of-probability or where those probabilities are calculated relative to certain sorts of bodies-of-evidence.  There are two plausible forms such a principle could take: to decide whether to report claims on a case-by-case basis or to use a fixed standard for reporting claims. Even if scientists could simply report epistemic probabilities, they would still need some principle – albeit one governing their assertion, rather than acceptance, of claims – akin either to the Rudner/Douglas or status quo options.

How should we choose between those options? I suggest that even if concerns about scientists’ usurping democratic deliberation about values can be overcome, option b. is problematic. To see why, consider an argument proposed by Torsten Wilholt (2013). Wilholt concedes that scientists face problems of inductive risk, and, as such, need some way of trading-off risks of false positives and of false negatives. However, if each scientist set this trade-off in her own way, then scientists would face co-ordination problems in deciding when and whether to rely on others’ results. According to this argument, fixed standards are far more efficient than floating standards.

Still, one might think that floating standards better serve the needs of policy-makers, suggesting a kind of tension between the needs of the scientific community and the larger community within which science is embedded. However, Wilholt’s argument can be generalised. A claim that might be “scientifically established” relative to the non-epistemic costs of error associated with some policy need not be “scientifically established” relative to the non-epistemic costs of error associated with a second. This is a significant problem. Consider a policy-maker who must make some decision. She knows that scientists recently investigated the same claim, because it was also relevant to a different policy. Under the status quo, even if the policy-maker cannot assume that an un-established claim should not play a role in her policy decision, she can reasonably assume that if scientists concurred that the claim was “established”, she should accept it. By contrast, under the Rudner-Douglas proposal, she cannot assume that an un-established claim should not be accepted nor can she assume that a previously established claim should be accepted.​[5]​ 

For all its faults, the status quo allows for portability of claims across contexts in a way in which the Rudner-Douglas option does not, therefore lowering the costs of policy-making. This is in addition to the benefits which Wilholt identifies: that fixed standards may be necessary for the efficient functioning of a scientific community. Therefore, reflection on the proper role of non-epistemic values in justification implies a stronger argument for the modest interpretation of the precautionary principle: not only is that principle important given how scientific investigation is arranged, but it is important given how scientific investigation ought to be arranged.    


Section 3: The politics of certainty and procedural objectivity

Let us take stock. Policy-makers must sometimes decide when a claim is “certain enough” to be accepted as a premise in decision-making. Scientists face a similar problem; even when they report claims conditional on their evidence, they must make choices about which claims to report. There are good reasons – both intra- and extra-scientific – why scientists ought to resolve their inductive risk problems by intra-scientific norms of epistemic caution. This implies that the SP is a sensible acceptance principle for policy-making, because established claims are “portable”, but that the WNP is not. Policy-makers should sometimes act on claims which scientists refuse to accept after thorough investigation. I have proposed a reading of the precautionary principle as a reminder of these facts. However, you may worry that this interpretation fails to capture something important about the precautionary principle: that it singles out a certain class of claims, those about significant environmental (or public health) harms, as special. Interpreting this feature of the principle may seem to require us to go beyond questions about proper acceptance to distinctively ethical questions about the commensurability of different forms of harm. I will now argue that we can account for why the precautionary principle treats certain harms as special without such analysis; rather, this feature reflects the uneasy relationship between the demand for floating acceptance principles and norms of procedural fairness.  

One general worry about the PP is that allowing claims which have not been scientifically established to play a role in decision-making provides policy-makers with carte blanche to pick-and-choose which claims to take seriously. In turn, such choices may be guided by factors which have nothing to do with the (likely) truth of those claims – such as political convenience or pandering to vocal elements of the public – thereby conflicting with the goal of reasonable and effective policy-making.​[6]​ However, to deny the WNP is not to say that “anything goes” in terms of what policy-makers should accept. First, one can hold that the SP is an important principle. Furthermore, one can propose that other forms of “certainty” should regulate policy-makers’ acceptance. However, there is a subtle problem with developing any such proposal: a potential conflict with (perceived) norms of procedural objectivity. 

Any attempt to think about how policy-makers should resolve problems of inductive risk – motivated by the concerns above – must recognise that the very same claim could be well enough established for use by a policy-maker in one decision-context, but not well-enough established for use by a second policy-maker in her decision context. For example, assume that there is some good evidence in favour of the claim that neonicitinoid exposure harms wild bee populations, although that evidence does not render that claim “scientifically established”. According to the arguments above, in such circumstances, a policy-maker might reasonably decide that this claim is well-enough established to be accepted for some purposes – say, deciding on farm subsidy policies – but, another policy-maker, working for the same government, might reasonably decide that the very same claim is not well-enough established for some second purpose – deciding on chemical regulation policy. This can happen because the two policy-makers are (quite properly) interested in different outcomes, such that the costs of false positives and of false negatives associated with the two policies differ. (These problems might be avoided were we to expect all policy-makers to consider all possible consequences of their actions (Sunstein, 2002). However, that proposal raises its own feasibility problems). 
Consider now a general feature of policy-making bureaucracies, well-explored by historians and sociologists of science. As Ted Porter explains, in a “public measurement system”, such as one used by state bureaucracies, there are strong forces requiring “standardisation” (i.e. that like cases be treated alike, or, at least, be seen to be treated alike) and “proper surveillance”. As a result, “there is a strong incentive to prefer readily standardizable measures to highly accurate ones, where these ideals are in conflict” (Porter, 1994, 391). For example, Porter suggests that state mandated systems for measuring the toxicity of chemicals may often differ from the “most accurate” measures, and “if an eccentric manufacturer were to invest extra resources to perform a state-of-the-art analysis, this would be viewed by the regulators as a vexing source of interlaboratory bias, and very likely an effort to get more favorable measures by evading the usual protocol, not as a welcome improvement in accuracy” (Porter, 1994, 391).​[7]​ That bureaucrats like rules may seem rather banal! However, the pressures towards standardisation which Porter identifies may reflect important normative concerns. Having fixed standards allows for oversight more easily than do more complex standards; as Porter’s example hints, it is easier to tell when a company is properly regulated when each company does the same tests than when each is allowed to do different tests. 

In the case of the science-policy-making link a similar concern arises. When we relax the demand that policy-makers’ acceptance of claims is anchored to scientists’ claims, we increase the risk that they will choose what to accept on irrelevant grounds, such as those of political advantage. Furthermore, even when policy-makers’ acceptance of not-scientifically established claims is not capricious but properly guided by concerns about different kinds of error, it is harder for publics to track whether this is so when principles allow that the very same claim may be accepted in one context but not in another. 

Such oversight relates, in turn, to a basic norm of procedural fairness: that like cases are treated alike. When we vary our standards for acceptance, two claims may be equally well-supported, but accepted by one agency, but not another, or accepted at some point-in-time, but not another, even when the evidence has not changed. These differential cognitive attitudes may have important effects on stakeholders (for example, in terms of the risks to which they are exposed or their ability to plan), thereby creating inequalities. A company might find, for example, that its claims about a product’s safety are deemed insufficiently well-supported, whereas a second company’s claims are accepted, while both claims enjoy equal degrees-of-support.  Of course, these differential outcomes may, ultimately, be justifiable, because there are good reasons to accept one claim and not accept the second (i.e. the costs of false positives and false negatives vary over the different contexts). However, it may well be hard to keep track of such calculations, such that using floating acceptance principles in policy-making increases the chances of unfair treatment. Furthermore, even when differential treatment is fair, it may appear unfair, and such concerns may be hard to dispel. Therefore, to the extent that we care that policy both is and is seen to be procedurally fair, we may prefer fixed standards – as represented, say, by the WSP – even when those principles are problematic as norms of rational decision-making.  

On the one hand, there are good reasons for acceptance principles which are not tied too closely to notions of “scientific certainty”; on the other hand, “floating” acceptance principles may undermine the (perceived) legitimacy of policy-making. I suggest that we can understand the precautionary principle as reflecting such concerns. In general, there are good reasons – tied to fairness – why policy-makers should adopt fixed standards. In turn, it seems sensible to tie these standards to those employed in scientific research (at least as long as we can be ensured that such research is, itself, not tainted by vested interests – which is no simple matter (Shrader-Frechette, 2015)). This reliance is grounded not so much on some special status of “scientific certainty” as a need to ensure that policy-making is seen to be objective. However, plausibly, we can, at least sometimes, over-ride normal deontic restrictions when the stakes are high enough: for example, we might think it is justifiable to over-ride conventional property rights to stop a fire (Sorell, 2013). Something similar is, I suggest, true when we think about acceptance, rather than action. That is to say, just as cases where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage are paradigm cases where we can over-ride conventional property rules, so, too, it is justifiable to over-ride conventional acceptance principles when considering such threats of harm. Hence, we need a principle which captures these concerns.
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^1	  For more on “epistemic standards”, see my ref omitted
^2	  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for forcing me to clarify these issues.
^3	  For discussion of the more general epistemological implications of these claims, see Fantl and McGrath, 2010
^4	  The relationship between debates over the precautionary principle and over inductive risk has also been discussed in great detail by Daniel Steel (2015, Chap.7 and 8). My concerns differ from Steel’s in that I am not so much concerned with constructing a positive account of a decision-making procedure, but, rather, trying to sketch a very general account of how issues around certainty play out in different fields – science and policy-making. While I find Steel’s model-based account of uncertainty illuminating as a way of understanding certain cases, it is less clear that all cases where we might think to adopt a precautionary approach necessarily involve model-based uncertainty; for example, uncertainty about the effects of neonicitinoid exposure on bees may be remedied by building a better model of how such exposures harm bees, but might also be resolved in multiple other ways, for example by constructing experiments which better control for confounders. Nonetheless, I take what I say here to be complementary with Steel’s more specific proposals. 
^5	  For a longer version of a related argument, see my (ref omitted)
^6	  See Resnik, 2003, for useful examples of how actual debates around precautionary policy-making often devolve into fights over whether “knowledge” or “hunches” should guide policy.
^7	  For further useful discussion of how concerns about “procedural objectivity” may favour processes which are not “objective” in the sense of mirroring reality, see Megill, 1994.
